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Carter, 'l'raynor, J., Spence, 
for a rehearing was deHied May 8, 
C. ,J ., and 'l'raynoe, .J., W\:re of the opinion 
should be granted. 
A. ~o. 24262. In Bank. Apr. 12, 1957.] 
Estate of ,JOSEPH C. POlSIJ, Deeease(l. 'l'HOMAS W. 
HUUHES, Appellant, v. IWBEH'l' L. l<'EIWUSON, as 
Executor, etc., et al., llespoudents. 
[1] Appeal-Loss or Waiver of Right of Review-Acceptance of 
Benefits.-Generally, the voluntary acceptance of the henefit 
of a judgment or order is a bar to the prosecution of an 
appeal, since the right to accept the fruits of the judgment 
and the right to appeal therefrom are wholly inconsistent, and 
an election to takP one is a renunciation of the other. 
[2] !d.-Loss or Waiver of Right of Review-Acceptance of Bene-
fits.-An exception to the rule that a party may not accept the 
fruits of a judgment and at the same time appeal therefrom is 
recognized where he is concededly entitled to the benefits that 
are accepted and a reversal will not affect the right to those 
benefits. 
[3] Id.- Loss or Waiver of Right of Review- Acceptance of 
Benefit,s.-\Vhere there was an agreement by an executor that 
his attorney's receipt of a fee awarded by the court for ex-
traordinary preliminary services would not bar the attorney's 
appeal from the "judgment," where before anything was paid 
the attorney advised the executor that he intended to appeal 
and that his acceptance of the amount awarded would not 
affect his appeal because he was claiming more, and where 
[1] Right of appeal from judgment or decree as affected by 
acceptance of benefit thereunder, note, 169 A.L.R. 985. See also 
Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 134; Am.Jur., Appeal and Error, 
§ 214 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 107; [2, 3, 5, 6] 
Appeal and Error,§ 110; [41 Decedents' Estates, § 151. 
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the executor was advised to the 
made partial on the award :md it was 
him, effect should be tlwre 
he no estoppel or waiver of the because of 
such payment and 
[4] Decedents' Estates-Executor-Powers and Duties.-An exe-
cutor is the duly authorized of the estate, and 
11s such he is in of the funds of the estate to 
the court's orders for of c>xpPnsPs of administration, 
claims against the estate and distribution to beneficiaries of the 
rstate. 
[51 Appeal-Loss or Waiver of Right of Review-Acceptance of 
Benefits. - 'fo bar the right of appC'al on the ground of 
aequiescPncc in the jud;onPnt, the arts relied on must be such 
as clearly and unmistakably show and acquics-
cPnce must be unconditional, voluntary and absolute. 
[6] !d.-Loss or Waiver of Right of Review-Acceptance of Bene-
fits.- An agreement that acceptancP of the benefits of a ;judg-
ment shall not bar the right of appPal will h(~ and 
it preservPs thnt right. 
MO'I.'ION to dismisR an appeal from a jndgnw11t of the 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Vietor R. Hansen, 
,T udge. Motion denied. 
Thomas \V. Hughes, m pro. per., and Alfred h Bartlett 
for Appellant. 
Ben lVI. Koelnmm for Hespondent Bmmn PoisL 
CARTER, ,T.~Tn this ease, Hughes, the attorney for the 
executor under dec·edent'f> \Yill in the above mentioned estate, 
petitioned the snperior c·onrt administering law in 
the estate JH'IH'eedings, to have it ot·clered that he be paid 
attorney's fees for extraordinary seryires performed in oppos-
ing the proerecling· in the lower court and on appenl by rlece-
dent's widow to revoke the will of clec~edcnt as to her on the 
ground that she was not providP<l fOl' as recrnire11 section 
70 of the Probate Code, the will having been made lwfore 
her maniage I o clct·t'<1t·llL ObjPt'l ion:.; ~wvt·e :filed to the peti-
tion and, after· l1<·uring ihPreon, iht· t'Otll't fuo]](1 tlwt in tlw 
prtWt'<'di111~·s for l'<'\'<H-Iltion qj' llle 11ill tltt' wir1ow di<1 not 
•·liilllt•llg•' tli" \alidity of the \rill but that it 
*Tltc widow was Jmsuecespful in the lower court whosp ordPr was 
nffirmed by the Distrirt Comt of but reversPd hY this eourt 
(Estate of Poisl, 44 Cal.2d 147 [280 7891). · 
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was revoked under section 70 which was the same as a petition 
to determine heirship under section 1080 of the Probate Code; 
that Hughes performed all the above mentioned services, but 
the preliminary services of bringing the parties (the legatees 
under the >Yill and the widow) before the court in the revoca-
tion proceedings was his only legal duty and such services 
were worth $1,000; that he had no duty to participate in the 
trial or appellate work in the revocation proceedings, and 
therefore fees for such services were not proper. Accordingly 
the court rendered its "judgment" that Hughes was "en-
titled'' to a $1,000 fee for the extraordinary preliminary serv-
ices. He appeals, asserting that he was entitled to compen-
sation for the services performed on trial and appeal as well. 
Defendant widow now moves to dismiss the appeal by reason 
of the acceptance by Hughes of the $1,000. On October 3, 
1955, after the court indicated what its order would be, 
Hughes wrote to the executor that he intended to appeal but 
that the only ground of appeal would be that more fees 
should have been allowed him and that the $1,000 to be 
awarded would not be affected, quoting from Clarke v. Angelus 
Memorial Assn., 14 Oal.App.2d 750 [58 P.2d 974], to the 
effect that where the question on appeal is whether the 
recovery should be greater than that allowed by the lower 
court, the acceptance of the amount adjudged due did not bar 
the appeal. After the order for $1,000 attorney's fees above 
mentioned was made (but prior to its entry), $300 thereof was 
paid to Hughes by the executor on October 19, 1955, and the 
balance of $700 was paid on October 28, 1955. On receipt of 
the check for $300 by Hughes on October 24, 1955, he again 
wrote to the executor stating that it was accepted "without 
prejudice" to his "contemplated appeal from the order" 
allowing $1,000 because he sought a larger sum which was in 
accord with the case theretofore cited in the former (October 
3, 1955) letter. At the time the balance of $700 was paid on 
October 28, 1955, he again advised the executor that it was 
accepted only on the condition specified in his former letters, 
he was not waiving his right to appeal, and would not sign 
or enter a satisfaction of judgment; this was ''agreed'' to 
by the executor, and no satisfaction of the $1,000 allowance 
has been made or entered. 
The widow asserts that there was a voluntary acceptance of 
the fruits of the judgment ($1,000) barring the right to ap-
peal. Hughes claims there was an agreement that the accept-
ance of the $1,000 should not be considered as barring the 
Apr.1957] EsTATE OF PorsL 
[48 C.2d 334; 309 P.2d 817] 
337 
appeal and that in any event the judgment for $1,000, which 
was accepted, was severable from the claim for fees for the 
litigation itself, to which he was entitled in any case, and 
was not placed in jeopardy by the appeal; moreover the 
widow did not appeal from the $1,000 award. 
[1] The latest statement by this court on the subject is 
as follows: "It is the general rule that the voluntary accept-
ance of the benefit of a judgment or order is a bar to the 
prosecution of an appeal, since the right to accept the fruits 
of the judgment and the right to appeal therefrom are wholly 
inconsistent, and an election to take one is a renunciation of the 
other. [Citations.] [2] An exception to the general rule 
exists where the appellant is concededly entitled to the bene-
fits which are accepted and a reversal will not affect the 
right to those benefits. [Citations.]" (Mathys v. Tttrner, 
46 Cal.2d 364, 365 [294 P.2d 947].) 
[3] But here, from Hughes' undisputed affidavit, we have 
an agreement by the executor that the receipt of payment of 
the $1,000 award would not bar the appeal. Before anything 
was paid on the judgment Hughes advised the executor that he 
intended to appeal and that the payment and acceptance of 
the $1,000 would not affect his appeal because he was claiming 
more. Thereafter the executor paid $300 and was again 
advised to the same effect. The same occurred on the payment 
and acceptance of the $700 balance and it was agreed to by 
the executor. There would appear to be no reason why effect 
should not be given to that agreement. There should be no 
estoppel or waiver of the right to appeal because of it. No 
point is made of whether the executor rather than the widow 
could make such an agreement but it would appear that he 
had the right to do so inasmuch as the matter involved was 
the payment of money for claimed attorney's fees from the 
assets of the estate. [4] There is no question that the 
executor was the duly authorized representative of the estate. 
As such he was in charge of the funds of the estate subject 
to the court's orders for payment of expenses of administra-
tion, claims against the estate and distribution to the bene-
ficiaries of the estate. 
While it has been held that a taking of possession after 
judgment in an eminent domain proceeding with the taker's 
reservation of the right to appeal does not, under the statutes 
there involved, preserve the right to appeal (lift. Shasta Power 
Corp. v. Dennis, 66 Cal.App. 186 [225 P. 877]) we find no case 
in this state holding that an agreement that an appeal shall 
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not be barred by acceptance of the benefits of the judgment 
(as distinguished from a unilateral reservation by the appel-
lant), will not preserve the right to appeal. [5] In regard 
to acceptance of the benefits of the judgment as barring the 
acceptor's appeal, it is said in Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal.2d 202, 
214 [259 P.2d 656]: "However,' (i)11 order to bar the right 
of appeal on the ground of acquiescence, "the acts relied upon 
must be such as to clearly and unmistakably show acquiescence, 
and it must be unconditional, voluntary, and absolute.'' ' 
(D1~ncan v. Duncan, 175 Cal. 693, 695 [167 P. 141] .) " 
[6] And it has been held that an agreement that the accept-
ance of the benefits of a judgment shall not bar the right of 
appeal will be recognized and preserves that right. (See 
Succession of Nicholich, (La.App.) 167 So. 831; L1:ghtnrr v. 
Board of S1~pervisors, 156 Iowa 398 [136 N.W. 761] ; City of 
Seattle v. Liberman, 9 Wash. 276 [37 P. 433] ; see cases contra 
169 A.L.R 985, 1058.) 
For the foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss the appeal 
is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, .J., 'fraynor, J., Schauer, ,J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 24415. In Bank. Apr. 12, 1957.] 
HOYT REED, Appellant, v. CARL 0. NORMAN et al., 
H<'spondents. 
[1] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation. 
-A motion to dismiss plaintifC's appeal from an adverse judg-
ment in a stockholder's derivative action could not be sustained 
on the ground that plaintiff no longer owned any stock in the 
corporation because of an execution sale where his uncontra-
dicted affidavit, filed in opposition to the motion, stated that 
the execution purchaser's bid was "for and on account of" 
plaintiff, and that any rights or interest in the shares sold at 
execution was for plaintiff's lwnellt. 
[2] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation.---A motion 
to disllliss plainti!T's :tpj.wal 1\mu :lll advt•rtw judgmPnt in n 
stutkholdt·r':-; tl••rivativP netiou eould not he snstaiw·d on thP 
gTmmd that tl!P!'P was no ,,howing of plnintiff's t·otupliHn<~f' 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 6, 7] Corporations, § 368; [3] Cor-
porations,§ 927; [4] Corporations,§ 353; [5] Corporations,§ 354. 
